It is widely believed that baseline imbalances in randomized clinical trials must necessarily be random. Yet even among masked randomized trials conducted with allocation concealment, there are mechanisms by which patients with specific covariates may be selected for inclusion into a particular treatment group. This selection bias would force imbalance in those covariates, measured or unmeasured, that are used for the patient selection. Unfortunately, few trials provide adequate information to determine even if there was allocation concealment, how the randomization was conducted, and how successful the masking may have been, let alone if selection bias was adequately controlle d. In this article we reinforce the message that allocation details should be presented in full. We also facilitate such reporting by identifying and clarifying the role of specific reportable design features. Because the designs that eliminate all selection bias are rarely feasible in practice, our development has important implications for not only the implementation, but also the reporting and interpretation, of randomized clinical trials.
Introduction
When lecturing on selection bias, we have addressed audience questions about how selection bias can occur in randomized clinical trials (RCTs) . After all, it may be argued, if any subversion occurred, then the trial was not truly randomized. This statement implies that randomization confers absolute protection against any subversion, so that any covariate imbalances must be random. Similar abilities are often ascribed to allocation concealment or masking. Yet the effect of an action may differ from its objective; washed dishes, e.g., may remain dirty; cooked food may remain cold; and treated patients may remain sick.
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Selection bias can compromise the credibility of standard between-group comparisons, especially when the trial is conducted by a sponsor with a vested interest in the outcome (Hogel & Gaus, 1999 ). Yet details sufficient to assess the success of randomization, allocation concealment, and masking are rarely reported (Kyriakidi & Ioannidis, 2002) .
This draws into question the reliability of the results of many RCTs that have been otherwise well conducted. In fact, if randomization is defined so as to eliminate the possibility of any subversion, then we question whether there has ever been a truly randomized trial. The irony is that until sufficient design details are routinely reported, it will be impossible to quantify the extent to which selection bias actually occurs in RCTs, yet this lack of reporting is likely due to failure to appreciate the extent to which selection bias occurs in RCTs. Our development clarifies those details that should b e presented in RCT reports. It is our hope that more RCT reports will provide these details, and test for selection bias explicitly (Berger & Exner, 1999) .
What Are Randomization, Allocation Concealment, and Masking?
In a discussion of the distinction between a claim of masking and true masking, Oxtoby et al. (1989) pointed out that "the presumption that a plan to which one has aspired has come to fruition by virtue of aspiration alone is not science, and is particularly inapposite for a profession which should have a reputation for making clear distinctions between fantasy and reality". This profound remark highlights the distinction between an action and its effect. Masking may be defined as either the process (researchers not revealing treatment codes until the database is locked) or the result (complete ignorance of all trial participants as to which patients received which treatments). A masking claim indicates only the former; this may help to ensure the ignorance of some parties, but is unlikely to ensure the desired state of complete ignorance.
As the legal term "inevitable discovery" suggests, knowledge transfers by various mechanisms. It may be possible to fool all of the people some of the time, or some of the people all of the time, but it is not possible to fool all of the people all of the time. Just as a speed limit is a statement not about how fast drivers drive but rather about how fast they are encouraged to drive, so too is a policy of masking a statement not about who knew what (and when) but rather about a process.
Masking is often said to be possible only some of the time, while allocation concealment (Schulz, 1995a,b; 1996) , which is essentially the masking of each allocation just until it is executed, is always possible. This confusion o f the two definitions is a double -standard. If masking is possible only some of the time, then clearly reference is being made to the result, and not the process.
To be fair, then, one would have to ask if the result of allocation concealment is always possible. Sealed envelopes have been held to lights, phantom patients have been enrolled, and locked files have been raided to determine upcoming treatment allocations in successful subversions of allocation concealment (Schulz, 1995a) . Also, it may be clear what a given patient would receive, if enrolled, if cluster randomization (Jordhoy et al., 2002) or minimization (Pocock & Simon, 1975 ) is used. Drug bottle numbers can also lead to prediction (Kuznetsova, 2002) . So only the process of allocation concealment, but not its result, can be ensured. Without the result of allocation concealment, selection bias remains a concern.
Mechanisms for Selection Bias, and Specific Countermeasures
To focus ideas, we confine our attention to selection bias that interferes with internal validity (a fair comparison, Mark, 1997); we do not consider external validity. Groups of patients to be compared may differ in important ways even before any intervention is applied (Prorok, Hankes, & Bundy, 1981) . These baseline imbalances cannot be attributed to the interventions, but they can interfere with and overwhelm the comparison of the interventions (Green & Byar, 1984) .
If treatments are independent of patient characteristics, then any baseline imbalances (even if statistically significant) are due to chance variation only. This is one reason often cited for using randomization.
On the other hand, a systematic explanation for the imbalances, known or unknown, would constitute selection bias, even if the imbalances are not statistically significant, or even readily observed (Berger & Exner, 1999) . We present a sequence of mechanisms by which selection bias may occur, starting with observational studies in Section A, and such countermeasures as randomization, allocation concealment, and masking (see Table 1 ). Investigators may assign treatments based on patient characteristics (Green & Byar, 1984; Rubin, 1977) . Patients may select either their treatment or, with consumer randomization (Bird, 2001) , their randomization probability, at least from among a given set of choices. Allocation discretion may be available to the patient, the investigator, both, or neither (dictated allocation). Those patients selecting one treatment or probability may differ systematically from those selecting another (Green & Byar, 1984) , so dictated allocation (no freedom of choice) is a countermeasure to prevent patient characteristics from influencing the allocation sequence through either overt treatment assignment based on patient characteristics or self-selection.
B. Selection Bias with Dictated Allocation
If allocation is alternated, then either patients with even accession numbers or patients with odd accession numbers receive the active treatment. The others receive the control. This dictated allocation would prevent the type of selection bias considered in Section A. But with sequential accrual, knowledge of the upcoming treatment, and enrollment discretion (Chalmers, 1990) , an investigator could deny enrollment to patients lacking the characteristics that would make them "suitable " to receive the upcoming treatment (Schulz, 1995a; Schulz & Grimes, 2002a) .
The selection bias enabled by the predictable allocation sequence (Schulz & Grimes, 2002b) can be controlled by creating instead an unpredictable allocation sequence, or randomizing (Rosenberger & Lachin, 2002) . The second countermeasure is the use of actual (not virtual, quasi-, or pseudo-) randomization (Berger & Bears, 2003) to prepare the allocation sequence.
C. Selection Bias with Dictated Allocation and Randomization
Urn randomization (Wei & Lachin, 1988 ) is conducted by tossing a (possibly biased) coin each time a patient is to be allocated. Heads indicates active treatment, and tails indicates control. There is no actual allocation discretion, yet having screened and evaluated a given patient, the investigator might exercise de facto allocation discretion to reject the toss and repeat until the preferred allocation is observed.
Another mechanism for selection bias with dictated allocation and randomization would be possible if minimization, or dynamic randomization (Pocock & Simon, 1975) , were used to force balance with respect to certain covaria tes. The allocation is determined by minimizing an imbalance function, and randomization may be used to break the ties. So there is both dictated allocation and randomization. Yet because most allocations will be deterministic, it would be possible to determine the allocation to be made once a patient has been identified. A patient enrollment decision may be based on a combination of the treatment to be assigned and values of observed covariates that were not used to define the imbalance function. Randomization is conventional if the allocation sequence is generated in advance of screening any patients, and unconventional otherwise. Conventional randomization prevents the types of selection bias discussed in this section, and is our third countermeasure.
D. Selection Bias with Dictated Allocation and Conventional Randomization
As in Section B, selection bias may result from enrollment discretion and advance knowledge of the allocation sequence; the latter may be facilitated by conventional randomization, as the allocation sequence may be posted publicly before patients are screened (Schulz & Grimes, 2002a) . A countermeasure to eliminate this advance knowledge is that each allocation be determined only after the patient to be enrolled is identified (Clarke, 2002) , as occurs with minimization (Pocock & Simon, 1975) . Either the allocation to be made or the patient to be enrolled has to be selected first; whichever it is may influence the other, and the biases possible with unconventional randomization (Section C) are at least as serious as the biases possible with conventional randomization.
Unconventional randomization may not be able to eliminate advance knowledge of patient characteristics, but one might hope to eliminate advance knowledge of the allocation sequence with conventional randomization and the fourth countermeasure, allocation concealment, which is often taken to mean precisely this lack of advance knowledge. But recall that allocation concealment signifies only that the allocation codes are not intentionally revealed. Even with steps to ensure that these codes cannot be observed, e.g. by holding an envelope to a light (Schulz, 1995a,b) , it is not possible to enumerate, and rule out, all mechanisms by which allocations can be observed. We are not prepared to take the success of allocation concealment on faith in an actual trial; we do so for the purpose of this article to demonstrate that even in this unrealistically optimistic case, subversion is still possible.
E. Selection Bias with (D) and Allocation Concealment
In a randomized depression study of nurse telehealth care (Hunkeler et al., 2000) , the initial 40:60 randomization to two groups later became 40:20 to those same two groups, with the remaining 40% allocated to a new third group. If the change in allocation proportions was planned (which need not be the case; see Lippman et al., 2001) , then even with allocation concealment it may still be possible to predict (but not observe) future allocations. Knowing that more late patients than early patients would be allocated to the third group constitutes advance knowledge of the allocations which, though imperfect, allows for deferred enrollment (Schulz, 1996) of those subjects most "suitable " for the third group until after the new proportions took effect. The fifth countermeasure, then, is the fixed allocation proportions that prevent this.
F. Selection Bias with (E) and Fixed Allocation Proportions
Randomization is unrestricted (Schulz & Grimes, 2002b ) if a patient's likelihood of receiving either t reatment is independent of all previous allocations, and is restricted (ter Riet & Kessels, 1995) otherwise. The random allocation rule (Schulz & Grimes, 2002b) , in which both treatment groups must be assigned equally often, is one form of restricted randomization, as the final allocation would be determined by the prior ones. Even with allocation concealment and fixed allocation proportions, patterns created by restrictions on the randomization allow prediction of the allocation sequence. Berger and Exner (1999) quantified this extent of advance knowledge with the probability, P{active}, of a given patient being allocated to the active group given the previous allocations.
With 1:1 allocation, P{active}=0.5 for the first patient; with alternation (Section B ), P{active} is always either 0 or 1. Note that P{active} reflects the restrictions on the allocation sequences, and becomes a patient characteristic only after that patient is randomized. With enrollment discretion, P{active} may be used, in conjunction with the estimated potential outcomes of each patient to each treatment, say Y={Y(A),Y(C)} for the active and control treatments, respectively, as a basis for enrollment decisions.
Gender, age, race, pre-existing medical conditions, or other baseline characteristics may be considered in deriving the value of Y for a given patient. Based on Y, the investigator might select a range of P{active} values for which the patient would be enrolled. If the P{active} value at the time this patient is screened happens to fall outside of this patient's P{active} range, then the patient will be denied enrollment, and another patient will be screened. Only when a patient is found with a P{active} range to match the actual P{active} value will the patient be enrolled.
Selection bias occurs if the P{active} range is restricted based on Y. It would be possible, e.g., to enroll patients only if P{active} and Y are both large (suppose that larger Y values indicate better responses) or both small, but not if they are discordant (Schulz, 1995a) . This possibility is depicted in Table 2 , using randomized blocks of size four to calculate P{active} (Berger & Exner, 1999) . Notice that not only does treatment assignment for randomized patients depend upon the allocation sequence, but in fact Patients #S5, #S7, #S9, and #S10 may or may not be randomized depending on the allocation sequence, and Patient #S3 cannot get the control.
Discussion
Few RCT reports make any effort to address the potential for selection bias. Presumably, this is due to unrealistically optimistic definitions of randomization, allocation concealment, and masking. Unfortunately, even in combination, these design features as implemented cannot eliminate selection bias. One may argue that while selection bias is possible in theory, its mechanisms are implausible, especially when the main analyses have low p-values.
Unfortunately, history has demonstrated the fallibility of the plausibility test; at best low pvalues rule out (probabilistically) chance events, but they do not rule out biases (Berger, 2000; Berger et al., 2000; Grimes and Schulz, 2002) . Because of the one-sponsor problem (Hogel & Gaus, 1999) and the vested interest the one sponsor usually has in the outcome of the trial, the best way to offer a convincing argument that a trial was free of a certain bias is to eliminate the possibility of its occurrence. Hence, the burden needs to be on the researchers to demonstrate the reliability of their results. In this article we have presented a number of countermeasures, few combinations of which would eliminate the potential for selection bias. In most cases, then, it is unrealistically optimistic to believe that RCTs are insulated from severe bias (Schulz, 1996) .
We are hopeful that the information presented in Table 1 will accompany reports of future trials, preferably in the text of the article, but possibly in an accompanying web site. Such transparency would enable readers to determine the extent to which various mechanisms for selection bias were possible in a given trial, and the extent to which it appears as though there actually was selection bias. The refined measures of trial quality could be used in determining the extent to which specific trials influence policy and meta-analyses. This would exert pressure on those who design trials to design better trials. We are hopeful that journal editors, regulators, and granting institutions will rely, in part, on this information to make their important decisions. Berger and Exner [3] using the randomized block procedure with a fixed block size of four. Not only does treatment assignment for randomized patients depend upon the allocation sequence, but in fact Patients #S5, #S7, #S9, and #S10 may or may not be randomized depending on the allocation sequence, and Patient #S3 cannot get the control.
